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I.   DEVELOPMENTS IN D. T. SUZUKI RESEARCH
With the year 2016 marking the fiftieth anniversary of his death, scholars have been turning a fresh eye to D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966). 
Their efforts are not limited to studies of Suzuki the individual; their impor-
tance extends to scholarship on modern Japanese thought and religion. 
First, I will provide a simple overview of the history of research on D. T. 
Suzuki.1
In the past, scholarship on D. T. Suzuki was carried out by researchers 
who were taught or influenced by him, such as Furuta Shōkin, Kirita Kiyo-
hide, Ueda Shizuteru, and Akizuki Ryōmin. They focused on uncovering 
and organizing materials related to Suzuki, as well as honoring and recog-
nizing the man and his work. We can see this as the first period in the his-
tory of research on D. T. Suzuki.
However, starting around the 1980s, critical studies began to appear in a 
flurry in response to existing research with its slant towards praising Suzuki. 
This development, which began overseas, included Brian Victoria’s Zen at 
1 Being an overview, in this section I have omitted citations of individual texts. An exam-
ination of some of the research on Suzuki that follows can be found in Sueki 2010.
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War (1997), as well as the work of Robert Sharf and Bernard Faure. They 
directed their criticisms towards Suzuki’s war cooperation and national-
ism. At its root, this was also a criticism of the European and US Buddhist 
world, which had absolutized him. It had been as if all of Suzuki’s views 
were the correct understanding of Zen, with no need for modification or 
revision. This was the second period in the history of research on D. T. 
Suzuki.
In recent years, Suzuki’s thought has begun to be reexamined in a new 
way, which takes into account such criticisms. This is the third, and still 
ongoing, period. Along with numerous efforts to uncover Suzuki-related 
materials, there have also been many publications and exhibitions relating 
to him. At the same time, scholarship by a new generation of researchers 
has been flourishing, pushing Suzuki scholarship forward.
Document surveys have resulted in the publication of his manuscripts 
held at Matsugaoka Bunko, and a clearer picture has emerged of his activi-
ties in the United States during his later years. Many of Suzuki’s writings 
have been released in the pocket paperback format, which are more accessi-
ble than, for example, his complete works. These include the 2010 complete 
version (with chapter 5) of Nihonteki reisei 日本的霊性 (Japanese Spiritual-
ity, 1945) by Kadokawa Bunko, for which I wrote a commentary; Moriya 
Tomoe’s new anthology of Suzuki’s writings, Zen ni ikiru 禅に生きる 
(Living in Zen, 2012) also by Kadokawa Bunko; the publication in 2016 of 
Japanese-language translations of Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism and The 
Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk as well as Jōdokei shisōron 浄土系思想論 
(On Pure Land Thought, 1942) by Iwanami Bunko; and the publications by 
Kōdansha Gakugei Bunko in 2016 of both Suzuki’s translation of Sweden-
borg’s Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell from Things Heard and Seen (Jp. 
Tenkai to jigoku 天界と地獄) and his biographical Suedenborugu スエデン
ボルグ. These works, along with the commentaries contained therein, have 
provided us with new perspectives. In the United States, the four-volume 
Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki (University of California Press) is in the pro-
cess of being published and has been receiving attention.
Commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Suzuki’s death, the 
exhibition “Daisetz and Matsugaoka Bunko” was held at Tama Art 
University Museum from July 2 to September 11, 2016, featur-
ing materials held by Matsugaoka Bunko. Important Suzuki-related 
items previously not shown to the public, such as early modern wood-
block prints of Buddhist images, were on display. The international 
symposium held at the International Research Center for Japanese 
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Studies (Nichibunken) on December 5–6, 2016, covered a variety 
of new issues from an international perspective. Furthermore, the 
D. T. Suzuki Museum, which opened in Kanazawa in 2011, is becoming a 
new hub for Suzuki research.
Recent scholarship is led by a generation temporally removed from 
Suzuki, which can adopt a more objective perspective. They are from 
a variety of fields—not only Chan/Zen studies—and bring with them a 
variety of interests. In the United States, the center of Suzuki research 
has shifted to a new generation of scholars, such as Richard Jaffe. Simi-
larly, in Japan, work on D. T. Suzuki by a new set of scholars is being 
published in rapid succession. This research is characterized by, first, a 
reexamination of Suzuki as a mystic, and individuals engaging in this 
research include Wakamatsu Eisuke, Andō Reiji, Yoshinaga Shin’ichi, 
and Nakajima Takahiro. Second, other critical research reconsiders his 
ideas about Buddhism from the perspective of contemporary Buddhist 
studies or Chan/Zen studies rather than focusing on his ideological and 
political positions. From the Buddhist studies side, we can point to Sasaki 
Shizuka, and from the world of Chan/Zen studies, Kinugawa Kenji. 
Ogawa Takashi, also from the latter field, adopts a more positive view of 
Suzuki’s work. While research on Suzuki’s thought typically gets caught 
up in Suzuki himself, Yamada Shōji has offered a new perspective by 
examining Suzuki objectively by focusing on his reception overseas and 
on the life of his son, Alan.
The first half of this paper will provide an overview of Suzuki’s life 
and intellectual development, and the second half considers in detail the 
evolution of his thought regarding the notion of “Person” from Nihonteki 
reisei through to Rinzai no kihon shisō 臨済の基本思想 (The Fundamental 
Thought of Linji, 1949).2
2 Suzuki would attach Japanese emphasis marks (bōten 傍点) to the Sino-Japanese 
character for person (人) to differentiate it from its ordinary usage. He also indicates that it 
should be read as nin, not hito or jin, as it would normally (Rinzai no kihon shisō in SDZ, 
vol. 3, p. 350). 
Translator’s note: In this paper, following Norman Waddell’s translation of Nihonteki 
reisei (Suzuki 1972), the translator has chosen to express this concept in English by writing 
“person” with a capital P (“Person”). In Suzuki’s writings and the author’s original Japanese 
version of this paper, phrases containing this term appear multiple times, sometimes with 
and sometimes without marks indicating that this character refers to “Person.” I have used 
“Person” and “person” to distinguish these accordingly in such cases. The author of this 
paper indicates Suzuki’s emphasis marks with angled brackets:〈nin〉,〈人〉. I have followed 
this convention when providing the original Japanese in the following.
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II.   LIFE AND WORKS: PERIODIZATION
Suzuki was born in 1870 in Kanazawa City, and passed away at the age of 
ninety-six at St. Luke’s Hospital in Tokyo in 1966. Not including his time 
studying as a student and engaging in religious training during his younger 
days, he wrote and gave lectures as an active intellectual for seventy years, 
beginning with his translation of Paul Carus’s The Gospel of Buddha (Budda 
no fukuin 仏陀の福音) into Japanese in 1895. For more than ten years 
between 1897 and 1908, he lived in the United States, devoting himself to 
research under Paul Carus. After returning to Japan via Europe in 1909, he 
taught English as a professor at Gakushuin University, and then in 1921 he 
became a professor at Otani University in Kyoto, which is affiliated with 
the Shin sect, where he worked until 1960. After World War II, while often 
returning to Japan, he based himself in the United States from 1950 to 
1959, where he continued to give lectures at a variety of places, including 
Columbia University.
In this way, Suzuki’s activities consisted of two long periods in the 
United States interspersed with periods in Japan. He was active in Japan 
before first leaving for the US, between these two periods, and after return-
ing towards the end of his life. However, the times preceding his first and 
following his second American period were comparatively short. Thus, we 
can see 1909 to 1950 as the major period of his activity in Japan.
With that said, the situation is somewhat complicated. Even after return-
ing to Japan, he published important works in English during the 1920s 
and 1930s, which were very well received in Europe and the United States. 
If we focus on his writings, we can divide his life into the four periods 
below.
(1) Early works. From the 1890s to the 1910s, before he went to the United 
States, his time residing there, and his professorship at Gakushuin after 
returning to Japan.
While also writing about Zen, he adopted a wider perspective, focusing 
primarily on Buddhism in general and Swedenborg. During this time he 
published a Japanese translation of The Gospel of Buddha, Shin shūkyō ron 
新宗教論 (A New Theory of Religion, 1896), his English translation of The 
Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Ch. Dasheng qixinlun 大乗起信論; 
Jp. Daijō kishinron; 1900), his own monograph Outlines of Mahāyāna Bud-
dhism (1907), as well as a Japanese translation in 1910 of Swedenborg’s 
Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell from Things Heard and Seen.
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(2) English-language writings. The 1920s and 1930s, after he moved to 
Otani University. 
While he was in Japan, he wrote his major works in English. This was 
probably done with the help of his wife Beatrice. In addition to books that 
became popular in the United States and Europe like Essays in Zen Bud-
dhism (1927, 1933, 1934) and Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese 
Culture (1938), he also produced an English translation and study of the 
Laṅkāvatāra Sutra (1932), which would become his doctoral dissertation.
(3) Japanese-language writings. From the end of the 1930s until he began 
to base his activities out of the United States after World War II. 
During this period he wrote his major Japanese works, such as Mushin 
to iu koto 無心と言ふこと (What is No-Mind?; 1939), Jōdokei shisōron, 
Nihonteki reisei, Myōkōnin 妙好人 (Wondrously Happy People, 1948), and 
Rinzai no kihon shisō. The timing of these works is due perhaps to Beatrice 
having passed away in 1939, and to the difficulty of writing for an overseas 
audience as the war approached. Many of his works during this period were 
academic in nature. He brought them together in volumes 1 (1943) and 2 
(1951) of his Zen shisōshi kenkyū 禅思想史研究 (Research on Chan/Zen 
Intellectual History).
(4) Lectures in the United States. Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist (1957), 
Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (1960), and so on. 
His lectures in the United States have been reconstructed from the 
drafts held at Matsugaoka Bunko, and were recently published in transla-
tion as Zen hakkō 禅八講 (Eight Lectures on Zen), and Suzuki Daisetsu 
Koronbia Daigaku seminā kōgi 鈴木大拙コロンビア大学セミナー講義 
(D. T. Suzuki’s Columbia University Seminar Lectures). In the last few 
years of his life he also worked to translate into English canonical works 
such as Shinran’s Kyōgyōshinshō 教行信証 (Teaching, Practice, Faith, and 
Realization) and the Biyan lu 碧巌録 (Jp. Hekiganroku; Blue Cliff Record).
In this chapter I focus on Suzuki’s Japanese writings from the third 
period of his life. We need to locate this period within an overall image of 
Suzuki, and it is to this that I will first turn.
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III.   DIVERSITY AND UNITY IN SUZUKI
Suzuki wrote many works over his long life. For this reason, evaluations 
of him vary considerably depending on which aspect in those works is the 
focus of attention. His way of writing was not always the same: not only 
did it change over time, he also had diverse readers in mind depending on 
the language in which he was writing. This, in turn, led to differences in the 
way he was received. In Europe and the United States, where Zen itself was 
not known, he was enthusiastically greeted as an evangelist of this com-
pletely new culture. In contrast, in Japan, there was traditional Buddhism, 
of which Zen was a part. However, in the midst of modernization, it became 
necessary to reinterpret this traditional Buddhism. Suzuki played a major 
role in this project, but his position therein was somewhat ambiguous.
In his youth Suzuki had withdrawn as a student from Tokyo Imperial 
University. He did not have academic qualifications from Japan, and he did 
not receive a formal education in the United States. He taught for many 
years at the Buddhist Otani University after returning to Japan, but this was 
an institution affiliated with the Ōtani branch of Shin Buddhism and not 
with one of the Zen schools. He later received a PhD from the university 
for his research on the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra. Subsequently, despite carrying 
out cutting-edge academic research (such as his studies of early Chan Dun-
huang texts), he was not necessarily part of the mainstream of modern Bud-
dhist studies. Always placing himself in ambiguous positions—researcher 
and popular educator; Zen and Pure Land; Japan, Europe, and the United 
States—his identity was not fixed, and we cannot unequivocally place him. 
This contrasts with Suzuki’s close friend Nishida Kitarō, who had a clear 
position as a philosopher in the academic space that was Kyoto Imperial 
University. This ambiguity of Suzuki’s has made research difficult.
Do the multitudes that comprise this diverse Suzuki ever become inte-
grated? David L. McMahan sees Suzuki as a representative figure of “Bud-
dhist modernism”:
Suzuki wrote that Zen in its essence was an experience that tran-
scended the particularities of any religion. Not only was the liber-
ating experience of satori the essence of Zen, it was the essence 
of all religion, though found in its purest form in Zen. Suzuki 
therefore de-emphasized not only Zen’s intimate connection to 
the history of Buddhism but presented everything except the 
“Zen experience” as peripheral. This emphasis on the authority of 
personal intuitive experience over tradition, ritual, and social life 
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would become a prominent feature of some versions of Buddhist 
modernism.3
The above passage accurately captures the essence of modern Buddhism. 
As the term “funerary Buddhism” indicates, even in modern times, the 
essence of the social role of Japanese Buddhism has been funerary rites 
and grave management. This is what has created its economic foundation. 
However, on this foundation there was built an elite-level discourse that 
trumpeted pure belief and Zen experience as Buddhism’s superior aspects. 
Suzuki was a layperson for his whole life; he never joined a temple as a 
priest. This enhanced his purist emphasis on experience. He transplanted 
this elite Buddhism overseas. If we call this “Buddhist modernism,” then 
we can certainly see Suzuki as one of its representatives.
A reverse perspective is possible. The Christianity introduced to Japan 
had its European-American historical and societal background removed, 
and in Protestantism, in particular, it brought its modernity to the fore by 
emphasizing only pure faith. This purification was rendered thoroughgoing 
by the non-Church movement (mukyōkaishugi 無教会主義), which had not 
existed in Europe or the United States. Buddhism in Europe and the United 
States and Christianity in Japan were in the same position.
McMahan writes the following regarding the trope employed by the 
Buddhist modernism that Suzuki spread: “Suzuki also promoted one of 
the common—if overly simplistic—tropes of Buddhist modernism: that 
the ‘East’ was intuitive, aesthetic, and spiritual, while the ‘West’ was 
technological, rational, and material.”4 This “East versus West” schema 
has lived on to today while variously changing its form. Such a discourse 
can be found not only in Europe and the United States but also in Japan. 
We should take note of the relationship between the “East” and “Japan” 
therein. Often times Japan is understood to represent the “East,” and it 
becomes an expression of Japanese cultural nationalism. This is similar to 
how “Greater East Asia” in the phrase “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere” (Daitōa kyōeiken 大東亜共栄圏) really meant “Japan,” and to how 
the word “Japanese” in the title of Suzuki’s work Japanese Spirituality is 
vague.
If we assume Suzuki is basically a “Buddhist modernist,” what does 
this actually mean? McMahan pointed to Suzuki’s emphasis on the “Zen” 
religious experience. How did this appear in Suzuki’s thought? In recent 
3 McMahan 2012, pp. 164–66.
4 McMahan 2012, p. 166.
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years Suzuki’s early writings, such as Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism and 
his research on Swedenborg, have been attracting attention. It may be that 
through them we can reach an understanding of the fundamental ideas that 
run through from his early to his later periods. It is from this perspective 
that Andō Reiji, for example, has examined Suzuki’s early-period thought.5 
This enables us to consider that which runs consistently throughout the 
established multi-dimensional image of Suzuki.
His 1907 Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism was the final work from his 
time spent under Paul Carus. Sasaki Shizuka, in his translator’s afterward to 
the Japanese-language edition, has critically examined its content in detail.6 
This work is known for the harsh critique levelled at it by Louis de La 
Vallée-Poussin, an authority in Buddhist studies at the time.7 Sasaki, agree-
ing with de La Vallée-Poussin’s critique, lists several more issues and then 
points out, “Almost all of the concepts comprising this book, which Suzuki 
presents as fundamental elements, are mistaken.”8
However, as Sasaki also states, “A person with even a little interest in 
the doctrines of Japanese Buddhism will probably affirm many of the ways 
of thinking introduced by Suzuki in this book as being Mahayana Bud-
dhist thought.”9 In other words, while his arguments might not constitute 
a proper understanding of the Mahayana Buddhist thought that originally 
appeared in India, they are not necessarily inadequate as a traditional Japa-
nese understanding of Mahayana Buddhism. Suzuki’s ideas about Mahayana 
Buddhism took as their basis the Dasheng qixinlun, which he translated 
into English as Aśvaghoṣa’s Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the 
Mahāyāna, and which emphasized concepts like suchness (Ch. zhenru 
真如; Jp. shinnyo), tathāgata-garbha (womb of the tathāgata; Ch. rulai 
zang 如来蔵; Jp. nyoraizō), and the dharma body (Ch. fashen 法身; Jp. hos-
shin). However, Suzuki’s stance goes beyond the scope of Japan’s Maha-
yana Buddhism in certain repects:
Individual existences have no selfhood or self-essence or reality. 
. . . The world of particulars is the work of Ignorance. . . . 
When this veil of Māya [sic] is uplifted, the universal light of 
Dharmakāya shines in all its magnificence. Individual existences 
5 Andō 2016a.
6 Sasaki 2016.
7 de La Vallée-Poussin 1908.
8 Sasaki 2016, p. 484.
9 Sasaki 2016, p. 485.
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then as such lose their significance and become sublimated and 
ennobled in the oneness of Dharmakāya.10
Here we can see that Suzuki’s understanding of Mahayana Buddhism 
included Vedic elements, such as the notions of “self-essence” (atman) and 
illusion (māyā). Regarding this point, Sasaki states, “The Japanese Buddhism 
itself on which Suzuki based his thought was different from original Indian 
Mahayana Buddhism. Rather than Buddhism, it was close to Vedanta and 
other Hindu philosophy.”11 Certainly, in a sense, tathāgata-garbha thought 
is the foundation of Japanese Buddhism as a whole. This position has been 
criticized by the critical Buddhism (hihan Bukkyō 批判仏教) movement.
However, one does not find expressions like “the universal light of 
Dharmakāya shines in all its magnificence” in a traditional Japanese Bud-
dhist context. Rather, as Andō Reiji has pointed out, this matches the “‘spir-
itual world’ that Suzuki saw through his Swedenborg experience.”12 Andō 
believes this “spiritual world” (reikai 霊界) eventually led to Suzuki’s idea 
of reisei 霊性 (spirituality) as found in the title of Nihonteki reisei.13 This 
is certainly plausible. If true, we can see the consistent thread that Suzuki 
pursued throughout his life as the intellectualization or systematic articula-
tion of religious experience. While his friend Nishida Kitarō would shift his 
thought from the idea of pure religious experience to the ontological notion 
of “place” (basho 場所), Suzuki for his whole life continued to focus on 
things related to religious experience.
In his English-language writings, Suzuki wrapped this “spiritual” reli-
gious experience in the keyword “Zen,” to which he connected “Japan.” 
However, as McMahan points out, to do so he “articulated some of the 
difficult themes of Zen in the vocabulary of Idealist, Romantic, and Tran-
scendentalist thinkers of the nineteenth century,”14 which led Europe and 
the United States to read the underside of their own modernity into Zen. We 
could see this as a typical example of Orientalism. We might suggest that 
Suzuki ended up glorifying “Japan” and “Zen” so as to satisfy this Euro-
pean and American tendency. 
10 Suzuki 1907, p. 179.
11 Sasaki 2016, p. 485.
12 Andō 2016b, p. 556.
13 Andō 2016b, p. 558.
14 McMahan 2012, p. 166. 
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IV.   THE NOTION OF “PERSON” IN NIHONTEKI REISEI
(1) Japanese-language Writings and Nihonteki reisei
From around 1939, when Beatrice passed away, Suzuki started writing his 
major works in the Japanese language. Due to the war’s intensification, 
it was becoming increasingly difficult to reach a European and American 
audience. It is notable that these Japanese works include textual research 
and excavations of new materials; here we find Suzuki the academic 
researcher at his best.
These studies gradually grew in number starting in the 1930s. In 1932 
he wrote his study of the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra, and in 1935 he published 
the “Rufajie pin” 入法界品 (Jp. “Nyūhokkai bon”; Entry into the Dharma 
Realm Chapter) of the Huayan ji 華厳経 (Jp. Kegonkyō; Flower Orna-
ment Sutra) as the Gaṇḍavyūha Sutra in English. However, his publica-
tions of critical editions of Chan texts (including Dunhuang manuscripts) 
were his major accomplishments. These included Rokuso dankyō 六祖
壇経 (Platform Sutra of the Fifth Patriarch, 1936), Jinne goroku 神会 
語録 (Record of Shenhui’s Sayings, 1934), Shōshitsu issho 少室逸書 
(Lost Works of Bodhidharma; 1936), and Bukka hekigan hakan gekisetsu 
仏果碧巌破関撃節 ([Yuanwu’s] Keeping the Beat to Smash the Barri-
ers at the Blue Cliff, 1942). His treatment of Dunhuang manuscripts led 
to a debate with Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962). Importantly, it was around 
this time that he discovered Bankei 盤珪 (1622–93), Suzuki Shōzan 鈴木 
正三 (1579–1655), and the myōkōnin.
In this academic research Suzuki consistently adopted a perspective 
on religious experience, which led from the idea of a “spiritual world” to 
“spirituality.” Suzuki discovered and produced research on experience-
oriented Buddhists who had been overlooked in previous academic studies. 
At the same time, while “Zen” was at the forefront of his English-language 
works, and he published many critical textual studies on its history, he often 
also paid attention to Pure Land Buddhism in his many Japanese-language 
works. Redefining Sukhāvatī and sahā (“Sukhāvatī is the world of spiritu-
ality, and sahā is the world of sensation and the intellect”),15 he included 
Pure Land thought within discussions of spiritual experience. By doing so, 
he eliminated the idea of a “spiritual world” that had a Swedeborgian feel 
to it and was able to discuss Chan/Zen and Pure Land Buddhism as issues 
belonging to the same sphere. Furthermore, while focusing on these two 
15 Suzuki (1942) 2016, p. 7.
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Buddhist schools, his discussions of spiritual issues transcended the frame-
work of Buddhism, covering the structure of religion as a whole.
Nihonteki reisei served as the apex of these Japanese-language works, 
synthesizing them together. However, Suzuki did not spend adequate time 
planning his monographs and polishing his writing, so sometimes their core 
arguments were unclear. There are more than a few cases in which it is hard 
to understand how one work relates to the others that preceded and fol-
lowed it. For example, consider the term reisei or “spirituality.” It appeared 
suddenly in Nihonteki reisei, and again after World War II in his 1946 Rei-
seiteki Nihon no kensetsu 霊性的日本の建設 (The Creation of a Spiritual 
Japan). In Nihonteki reisei, the idea was that “Japanese spirituality” had 
already been actualized in the past in Japan. In contrast, in his later work, 
Japan’s “spiritualization” is presented as a task yet to be embarked upon. 
There is slippage here. In other books, he did not attach any significance to 
reisei. Therefore, while it is less than certain that we can really place Nihon-
teki reisei at the center of his Japanese-language corpus, it is certain at the 
very least that it constitutes the culmination of the various intellectual ele-
ments he had developed in these writings.
Furthermore, Suzuki did not necessarily pay particular attention to a 
book’s structure. For example, he later removed without explanation the 
fifth chapter of Nihonteki reisei entitled “Kongōkyō no zen” 金剛経の禅 
(Diamond Sutra Chan/Zen). His complete works and Iwanami Bunko fol-
low his lead in this regard.16 We can speculate that he might have wanted 
to decrease its length. However, he might also have been concerned that 
the chapter on Chan thought was inappropriate for a book about “Japanese” 
spirituality. Suzuki presents in this chapter the very important “logic of 
sokuhi” (sokuhi no ronri 即非の論理), sometimes translated into English 
as the “logic of contradictory self-identity” or “the logic of ‘is and is not.’” 
By excluding this discussion, Nihonteki reisei becomes a book only about 
Pure Land thought, not Zen; the logical aspect of “spirituality” is lost, as it 
is approached only from its emotional side. Depending on whether or not 
this fifth chapter is included, our understanding of Suzuki’s ideas on spiri-
tuality changes considerably. Believing that this chapter was indispensable, 
I included it in the 2010 complete version of this work that I compiled for 
Kadokawa Bunko. The analysis that follows draws on the Kadokawa edi-
tion of Nihonteki reisei.
16 “Kongōkyō no zen” is in the fifth volume of Suzuki’s complete works, separate from 
Nihonteki reisei.
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(2) The Notion of “Person” in Chapter 2 of Nihonteki reisei
Ideas regarding the notion of “Person” serve as an important part of Nihon-
teki reisei. Since they are carried over into Rinzai no kihon shisō, let us first 
examine them here. Chapter 2, which is about “spirituality,” discusses the 
issue of “the supra-individual Person” (chōko no〈nin〉超個の〈人〉) and 
the “one individual person” (hitori 一人). While Suzuki’s explanations are 
sometimes hard to understand, he uses the expression “the supra-individual 
Person that lies at the basic ground of the individual self,” contrasting it 
with a self that does not “encounter spirituality itself.” He also states, “The 
supra-individual Person is the genuine individual.”17 We could say that it is 
the individual that has awoken to the universality that is spirituality. “Spiri-
tuality” as religious experience can, in Buddhist terms, be described as 
acquiring a dharma body. In the past—as we saw in the portion of Outlines 
of Mahāyāna Buddhism quoted above—Suzuki had said that individual 
existences are absorbed into the singularity of the dharma body; the indi-
vidual dissolves. However, here spirituality is not a simple negation of the 
self; the subject again rises. The “supra-individual Person” is a subject that 
has, in this way, reengaged with the world as an individual.
Here we should note that this “supra-individual Person” can be consid-
ered from both a Zen and a Pure Land perspective.
Different tendencies or directions in the movement of Japanese 
spirituality are noticeable between Shin (and the other Pure Land 
sects) and Zen. The former always sees the supra-individual Per-
son in the direction of the individual self, while the latter sees the 
individual self in the direction of the supra-individual Person.18
While Suzuki does not provide a detailed explanation here, he points to 
the phrase, “this one individual person, Shinran” (Jp. Shinran ichinin 親鸞
一人) as an example of the Pure Land “Person,” and Linji’s “true person 
of no rank” (Ch. yi wuwei zhenren 一無位真人; Jp. ichi mui shinnin) as an 
example of the Zen Person. We could say that in the case of Shinran, the 
“supra-individual Person” is expressed in the context of the individual 
who is an ordinary being (or bonbu 凡夫 in Japanese), and in the case of 
Linji that the “genuine individual” is expressed in living in the “supra-
individual,” having gone beyond the self. The former is emotional, the lat-
ter intellectual.
17 Suzuki 1972, pp. 76–77; Suzuki 2010, p. 109.
18 Suzuki 1972, pp. 76–77; Suzuki 2010, p. 109.
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Had Suzuki pursued to their conclusion these two directions, a truly 
interesting unfolding of thought would have been possible. However, 
insisting he had no wish to “be trapped between two different directions 
of thought,”19 he pursued this no further. He then turned the discussion 
to Japaneseness, stating that the above realization “was experienced only 
by means of Japanese spirituality.”20 While his argument in this section 
contains many jumps and is hard to follow, he points out that “Japanese 
spirituality possesses something that works within the emotional nature of 
the individual self,” and focuses on the phrase, “this one individual person, 
Shinran” as a typical example.21
Suzuki draws this phrase from Shinran’s statement in the Tannishō 
歎異抄 (Passages Lamenting Deviations of Faith): “When I reflect deeply 
on Amida’s Original Vow which issues from his meditation for five long 
kalpas, I realize that it was solely for the sake of this one individual person, 
Shinran.”22 It was typical of Suzuki to identify an exceptional religious 
state in this statement. However, the phrase “this individual person, Shin-
ran” is premised upon a response to “Amida’s Original Vow which issues 
from his meditation for five long kalpas.” The Other (Amida Buddha) is 
required for it to be meaningful. Therefore, his argument linking it directly 
to the “supra-individual Person” is something of a shortcut.
(3) The Notion of “Person” in Chapter 5 of Nihonteki reisei
Suzuki also discusses the notion of “Person” in chapter 5 of Nihonteki rei-
sei. Here we find a more thorough explanation that fills in the gaps of chap-
ter 2. To explain the Diamond Sutra’s statement, “in accordance with non-
abiding yet giving rise to the mind” (Ch. yingwusuozhu ershengqiyi 応無所
住而生其意; Jp. ōmushojū jishōgoi), he quotes and discusses the meaning of 
“person” in the statement of Panshan Baoji 盤山宝積 (Jp. Banzan Hōshaku; 
n.d.), “All buddhas are persons; there is no difference between buddhas 
and persons” (Ch. quanfojiren renfowuyi 全仏即人人仏無異; Jp. zenbutsu 
sokunin ninbutsu mui) from Jingde chuandeng lu 景徳伝灯録 (Jp. Keitoku 
dentōroku; Record of the Transmission of the Lamp Published in the Jingde 
Era).23 Suzuki states, “From the standpoint of religious or spiritual life, 
19 Suzuki 1972, p. 78; Suzuki 2010, p. 109.
20 Suzuki 1972, p. 78 (modified); Suzuki 2010, p. 110.
21 Suzuki 1972, p. 78; Suzuki 2010, p. 111.
22 Suzuki 1972, p. 77 (modified).
23 Suzuki 2010, p. 355; T no. 2076, 51: 253b.
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one must no matter what extinguish all such discriminations, and function 
in absolute nothingness, in other words, non-abiding.”24 The “Person” is 
the subject’s functioning that comes into existence when the individual has 
entirely dissolved, after entrenchment as an individual is eliminated.
Suzuki then quotes the enlightenment song of the Zen mas-
ter Shidō Munan 至道無難 (1603–76)—“While living, be a dead 
man, thoroughly dead; Whatever you do, then, as you will, is always 
good,”25 which Nishida Kitarō also liked to quote—as well as Lin-
ji’s “true person of no rank.” Here we can clearly see a connec-
tion to Suzuki’s later Rinzai no kihon shisō. At the same time, he 
also presents the idea of jinen hōni 自然法爾, or “naturalness,” and 
Shinran’s statement “no working is true working” (mugi o gi to su 
無義を義とす), understanding “Person” as the “discrimination of non- 
discrimination” (mufunbetsu no funbetsu 無分別の分別).26 More than a 
few aspects of this are difficult to accept as they are; for example, con-
siderable use of original terms familiar to the Kyoto school of philosophy 
such as the latter phrase and the phrase “absolute nothingness” (zettai mu 
絶対無). Here, anyway, I limit myself to making clear that “Person” refers 
to a subject that begins to function after the individual has been temporar-
ily dissolved.
We should also note that following his discussion of “Person,” Suzuki 
turns to the issue of “passivity” (  judōsei 受動性). He begins doing so from 
the standpoint of Shinran’s Other Power (tariki 他力) of “no calculations 
(hakarai no nai はからいのない).” He states, “The final position of religion 
is the acquisition of passivity,”27 thereby turning to passivity as a funda-
mental problem of religion. He finds this passivity in the metaphor from 
Buddhist scriptures of a mirror that reflects all phenomena and in “likening 
the mind of religious belief to trees and rocks.”28 This is, in other words, 
the idea of “while living, be a dead man.” Thus, he finds passivity in both 
Zen and Pure Land teachings. His incorporation of this constitutive moment 
of passivity introduces the Otherness that was lacking in his aforemen-
tioned discussion of “this one individual person, Shinran.” The “Person” 
comes into existence only after taking in an outside stimulus. While Suzuki 
had already examined passivity head-on in his 1930 article for The Eastern 
24 Suzuki 2010, p. 356.
25 Translation from Suzuki 1972, p. 124.
26 Translation from Hirota et al. 1997, p. 666. 
27 Suzuki 2010, p. 360.
28 Suzuki 2010, p. 361.
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Buddhist “Passivity in the Buddhist Life,” by making it an important con-
stitutive moment for the “Person” in Nihonteki reisei, his ideas regarding 
spirituality acquired the potential to develop considerably.
Suzuki points out that this passivity is not simply passivity, for “the active 
is within the passive”;29 after one has thoroughly become a dead man while 
living, one acts as one wills. The Person takes on contradictions (that is, 
the logic of sokuhi), such as “the discrimination of non-discrimination, the 
non-discrimination of discrimination,” and “passive being active, active 
being passive.”30 This, Suzuki says, is jinen hōni, or naturalness.
As we have seen, in Nihonteki reisei, the constitutive moment of pas-
sivity is very important for the “Person.” In Suzuki’s later Rinzai no kihon 
shisō, however, this aspect is again ignored. In the end, the notion of pas-
sivity was not put to full use in his thought regarding the notion of “Person.”
V.   THE NOTION OF “PERSON” IN RINZAI NO KIHON SHISŌ
(1) Thought, Hermeneutics, and Intellectual History
Rinzai no kihon shisō was Suzuki’s last full-fledged Japanese-language 
monograph. We could call it a tour de force but it is certainly not easy to 
understand. Ogawa Takashi states, “While taking this idea of ‘Person’ as a 
self-evident premise, he just presents as examples Tang-period Chan practi-
tioners’ words and actions one after another.”31 Kinugawa Kenji remarked 
that “This is a work very hard to understand,” before examining each quota-
tion from the Linjilu 臨済録 (Jp. Rinzairoku; Record of Linji), and pointing 
out errors in Suzuki’s interpretations.32
While it is difficult to read and problematic, it deserves attention because 
Suzuki applies his notion of “Person” that he had matured since Nihonteki 
reisei to his interpretations of the Linjilu, and he also attempts to construct 
Chan intellectual history as the process of the establishment of Linji’s 
notion of “Person.” In other words, using “Person” as a keyword, Suzuki 
aims for an integration of thought, hermeneutics, and intellectual history. 
This work is hard to read because Suzuki does not discuss these three ele-
ments individually; they are indistinct. Furthermore, he does not always 
cover them in a systematic fashion. Nonetheless, Suzuki’s interpretation 
29 Suzuki 2010, p. 361.
30 Suzuki 2010, p. 362.
31 Ogawa 2011, p. 428.
32 Kinugawa 2016, p. 93.
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of the Linjilu is central to all of these. He fleshes out his understanding of 
“Person” based on this interpretation, and, having done so, reads this into 
the history of pre-Linji Chan thought.
We first note that at the beginning of chapter 1 of Rinzai no kihon shisō, 
Suzuki makes an important methodological statement regarding his inter-
pretation of the Linjilu: “The task of today is pointing to the fact of reli-
gious experience. The approach of contemporary research is to look at the 
Linjilu overall and trace the development of his [Linji’s] thought.”33 Here 
Suzuki presents “the fact of religious experience” and “thought” (shisō 思想) 
as two central concepts. As we have seen, the former is the core of Suzuki’s 
own thought. However, we must ask whether Chan/Zen can ever be seen as 
“thought.” Chan/Zen is thought’s rejection in that it does not accept teachings 
that are systematized thought. To say that Chan/Zen itself has thought is a con-
tradiction. Despite this, Suzuki tries to read thought into it. This is the basis 
upon which modern scholarship on the topic comes into existence. Suzuki 
wants to extract Chan/Zen thought out of the tension that exists between the 
two elements of “experience” and “thought” that he has established.
Before Nihonteki reisei, Suzuki had already published two works on 
Chan/Zen “thought” in 1943: Zen no shisō 禅の思想 (Chan/Zen Thought) 
and the first volume of Zen shisōshi kenkyū. We could say that Rinzai no 
kihon shisō considers Chan/Zen thought anew by discussing it as inherent 
within the Linjilu.
(2) The Notion of “Person” 
Suzuki identified the “Person” as comprising the fundamental thought of 
the Linjilu. Previously in Nihonteki reisei, along with “this one individual 
person, Shinran,” Suzuki had pointed to Linji’s “true person of no rank” as 
an example of thought regarding the “Person.” It appears that Suzuki forms 
his notion of “Person” out of a generalization of these two models. Suzuki 
directly addressed Linji’s thought in Rinzai no kihon shisō.
It is certainly true that, as Ogawa Takashi states, Suzuki does not really 
explain the notion of “Person” per se. This is because he was taking as a prem-
ise his ample discussion of it in earlier works such as Nihonteki reisei. While 
he does not provide a detailed explanation, in places such as the following he 
does present formularized expressions regarding the “Person,” as well as his 
“Person”-based understanding of the Linjilu, in a straightforward fashion:
33 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 343; SDS, vol. 15, p. 3.
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In Linji’s words, spirituality is the “Person.”. . . It is the “true 
‘Person’ of no rank,” or the “‘Person’ on the path who relies 
on nothing” (mue no dō〈nin〉無依の道〈人〉). The Linjilu is 
presented on the basis of this “Person,” and is a record of the 
functioning of this “Person.” By understanding this ‘Person,” one 
grasps that which runs throughout this text. . . . This “Person” is 
the supra-individual as well as a single individual. In other words, 
Linji is Linji as well as that which is not Linji. . . . The “Person” 
is one who lives the logic of sokuhi.34
Suzuki’s basic definition of “Person” can be found in his statement, “This 
‘Person’ is the supra-individual as well as a single individual.” In Rinzai no 
kihon shisō, Suzuki attempts to read the entirety of the Linjilu as illustrating 
the spiritual functioning that comprises this “Person.” He frequently states 
that this “Person” finds its most direct expression in the section about the 
“true ‘Person’ of no rank” in the chapter on “Ascending the Hall” in the 
Linjilu. Suzuki had already pointed this out in Nihonteki reisei where he 
quoted the original as follows:
“On your lump of red flesh is a true person without rank who is 
always going in and out of the face of every one of you. Those 
who have not yet confirmed this, look, look!” Then a monk came 
forward and asked, “What about the true person of no rank?” The 
master got down from his seat, seized the monk, and cried, “Speak, 
speak!” The monk faltered. Shoving him away, the master said, 
“The true person of no rank—what kind of dried piece of shit is 
he!” Then he returned to his quarters.35
Chan scholars in recent years do not see this passage as an expression of 
the fundamental thought of Linji. I will return to that point below, but here, 
let us examine how Suzuki understands this “Person” by going through 
its characteristics. Compared to Nihonteki reisei, in Rinzai no kihon shisō 
Suzuki explains the “Person” making more use of concrete texts. While his 
explanation is therefore somewhat involved, it is not indecipherable. 
First, the “Person” is not static but functions dynamically. As Suzuki 
states, in the Linjilu one finds the “Person” in phrases like “the person of 
34 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 350; SDS, vol. 15, pp. 12–13.
35 Quoted in SDZ, vol. 3, p. 352; SDS, vol. 15, p. 15. Translation based on Sasaki 2009, 
pp. 4–5. Japanese translation found in Iriya 1991, p. 20. 
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the way who depends upon nothing,”36 and “you, the persons who are lis-
tening to my discourse right now before my very eyes” (Ch. ni jijin mu- 
qian tingfade ren 你即今目前聴法底人; Jp. nanji sokkon mokuzen chōhōtei no 
nin).37 As he points out, “Linji frequently uses that [phrase] ‘tingfa de’ (聴法底) 
—‘who are listening to my discourse.’”38 This refers to the “you” (Ch. ni 你; 
Jp. chi)—in other words, the monks in training listening to Linji’s dharma 
talk. Suzuki sees this tingfa de as “the core of the notion of ‘Person’” because 
“[the phrase] ‘muqian xianjin’ 目前現今, or, ‘now before my eyes,’ on its own 
evokes a mere philosophical or intellectual existence, and no actual function-
ing emerges from it. . . . We must recognize that the uniqueness of [tingfa de] 
lies in its expressing the functioning [of the Person; that is, “listening”].”39 
Second, Suzuki admonishes against a pantheistic interpretation, which 
would hold that during religious experience the individual is dissolved in a 
dharma body-like totality. Putting aside the appropriateness of this definition, 
in Nihonteki reisei it at least seemed like we would be able to understand 
spiritual experience in this way: the establishment of the subject after having 
dismantled the individual. However, when it comes to the “Person” in Linji’s 
thought, the individual is not abandoned: “Linji’s ‘Person’ is not waiting 
behind the multitude of individuals (kota 個多).” He explains: “The multi-
tude of individuals are themselves ‘Persons.’”40 An individual fully exists as 
an individual, and the three bodies of the Buddha (the Dharma, reward, and 
response bodies) are also “not outside of the mind” (Ch. xinwai wufa 心外無法; 
Jp. shinge muhō).41 They are realized in the functioning of the individual. In 
this way, Suzuki thoroughly eliminates that which transcends the individual. 
However, how can there then be a “supra-individual individual”?
Third, the issue arises of how this “supra-individual” comes into exis-
tence. In this regard, Suzuki speaks of intellectual discrimination and spiri-
tual awakening, which he had covered before writing Rinzai no kihon shisō. 
He understands the supra-individual Person to be attained by spiritual expe-
rience: “When the intellect itself dies (Jp. sōshin shitsumyō 喪身失命; Ch. 
sangshen shiming), there is a spiritual awakening.”42 The supra-individual 
“Person” comes into existence when the intellect’s dualism vanishes: 
36 Translation from Sasaki 2009, p. 197. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 59.
37 Translation based on Sasaki 2009, p. 160. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 36.
38 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 386; SDS, vol. 15, p. 58.
39 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 386; SDS, vol. 15, p. 58.
40 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 385; SDS, vol. 15, p. 57.
41 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 367; SDS, vol. 15, p. 33.
42 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 507; SDS, vol. 15, p. 205.
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“Between spiritual awakening and intellectual abstraction there is an insur-
mountable trench.”43 
However, does this not again lead to a dualism between intellectual dis-
criminative thinking and spiritual awakening? According to Suzuki, this is 
not the case: “The experiential fact of intellectual discrimination penetrating 
its own non-discriminatory root—or its own root non-discrimination—is 
spiritual awakening.”44 Therein the “discrimination of non-discrimination” 
comes into existence. This is a very important point for understanding 
the spiritual “Person.” One must overcome a gap in going from the intel-
lectual to the spiritual. Therefore, “when reaching that which is a spiritual 
awakening, one becomes the ‘Person’ (〈nin〉o taitoku suru〈人〉を体得
する).”45 However, the individual that is discrimination does not disappear 
after this trench has been surmounted. The supra-individual that is non- 
discrimination is not separate from the individual that is discrimination; 
they cannot be divided. The supra-individual cannot come into existence 
outside of the individual. The “Person” that is the supra-individual individ-
ual is established where this contradiction exists as is.
The above can be illustrated as follows:
Intellectual discrimination ⇒ Spiritual awakening
Individual ⇒ “Person” (= individual + supra-individual)
This is Zen enlightenment put in modern terms.
Fourth, this “Person” is complete in itself, lacking nothing: “What is 
lacking?” (Ch. qianshao shenme 欠少什麼; Jp. kesshō jūmo).46 This is the 
state frequently described in the Linjilu as “doing nothing” (Ch. wushi 
無事; Jp. buji) or, in the words of Mazu 馬祖 (Jp. Baso; 709–88), of “the 
ordinary mind being the path” (Ch. pingchangxin shi dao 平常心是道; Jp. 
byōjōshin kore dō). Suzuki also uses the phrase kannagara no michi 神ながら
の道, or the “way of the gods.”47 He explains this as follows.
One returning (gensō ekō shite 還相廻向して) from [the state in 
which] “mountains are not mountains and water is not water” 
again to [the state in which] “mountains are mountains and water 
43 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 490; SDS, vol. 15, p. 184.
44 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 507; SDS, vol. 15, p. 205.
45 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 487; SDS, vol. 15, p. 180.
46 Quoted in SDZ, vol. 3, p. 379; SDS, vol. 15, p. 49. Translation from Sasaki 2009, 
p. 208. Japanese: Iriya 1991, p. 34.
47 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 380; SDS, vol. 15, p. 50.
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is water” is very different from the one who first said “mountains 
are mountains and water is water.” However, if we only look at 
what is apparent, in terms of that which makes the person of the 
path who relies on nothing be the person of the path who relies on 
nothing, there is neither gain nor loss whatsoever in the present, 
past, there, or here.48 
This is also the example Suzuki gives when discussing the “logic of 
sokuhi” in the fifth chapter of Nihonteki reisei. Ogawa Takashi explains 
this in an easy-to-understand way as turning from zero degrees to one 
hundred eighty degrees, and then to three hundred sixty degrees.49 If one 
rotates three hundred sixty degrees, then one is back at zero degrees. While 
it looks the same, it is “very different.” In appearance, the “Person” that is 
a “supra-individual individual” is no different than just an individual. Just 
by looking one cannot differentiate between the state of “doing nothing” 
in which someone has not engaged in any religious training (zero degrees) 
and the state of “doing nothing” in which, after religious training, someone 
has become enlightened (three hundred sixty degrees). However, here the 
problem of “do-nothing Zen”—which holds that it is fine not to engage in 
religious training or anything else—emerges.
Linji calls out to those who are listening to his dharma talk—“You, 
the persons who are listening to my discourse right now before my very 
eyes”—but have these persons truly rotated three hundred sixty degrees 
and arrived at a spiritual awakening? Probably not. Since they tend to be 
satisfied in a zero-degree state, Linji exhausts his words in his preaching, 
encouraging them to awaken. Thus, to the extent that they have not attained 
to the state of “true person of no rank” or to the state of “you, who are the 
persons listening to my discourse right now before my very eyes,” they are 
unable to manifest the functioning of a “Person.”
Above we considered four characteristics of the notion of “Person” that 
Suzuki identified in the Linjilu. While Suzuki discusses various other issues as 
well, his major points regarding the notion of “Person” can be found above.
Now, let us slightly change our perspective and turn to a fifth point, 
namely, that Suzuki does not only focus on Linji’s notion of “Person”; he 
also goes back into Chan history to identify Linji’s position therein. Suzuki 
points out, using concrete examples, that here and there one finds the notion 
of “Person” in Chan figures predating Linji. Here I would like to point to 
48 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 380; SDS, vol. 15, p. 50.
49 Ogawa 2011, p. 260.
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the fact that Suzuki summarizes Chan intellectual history at the end of this 
work in the following way:
The “mind of no-mind” (Ch. xin wuxin 心無心; Jp. shin mushin) 
transmitted by Bodhidharma became “seeing [buddha] nature” 
(Ch. jianxing 見性; Jp. kenshō) in Huineng 慧能 [Jp. Enō; 638–
713]. This clearly marked a turning point in Chan/Zen intellectual 
history. Shenhui 神会 [Jp. Jinne; 668–760], saying that “the single 
character for knowing (Ch. zhi 知; Jp. chi) is the gate of myriad 
wonders,” changed Huineng’s “seeing” into “knowing,” losing 
the outstanding nature of this idea. Mazu then advanced “func-
tioning” (Ch. yong 用; Jp. yū). Mazu’s Chan was one of “great 
capacity and great functioning” (Ch. daji dayong 大機大用; Jp. 
daiki daiyū). Linji changed this again. He synthesized seeing, 
knowing, and functioning as the “Person.” His “Person” is a very 
instructive concept. While considerable developments in Chan/
Zen thought could have been expected from this [idea], in both 
China and Japan it was not carried on.50 
Here Suzuki presents the development from the “mind” to “seeing,” “know-
ing,” “functioning,” and, finally, “Person.” We should note that all of the 
terms preceding “Person” are terms used in Buddhist doctrinal studies. The 
first three had been used since the time of Indian Buddhism. In other words, 
“they were always within the traditional vocabulary.”51 We could perhaps see 
“functioning” as a term imbued with the characteristics of Chinese thought. It 
is also an abstract philosophical one. Suzuki holds that Linji brought together 
these terms, expressing them not with traditional philosophical terminology 
but with the non-philosophical and concrete everyday term of “Person.” In 
order for Chan/Zen to exist as “thought,” it must be thought that lives with 
concrete reality as concrete reality, and not drawn back to abstract doctrinal 
studies. Such was one of the conclusions Suzuki reached after Nihonteki reisei 
when examining the Linjilu’s notion of “Person” in his final major Japanese-
language work.
(3) A Critical Examination of the Notion of “Person” 
As touched upon above, recent research on the Linjilu is skeptical of inter-
pretations that emphasize the “true person of no rank,” as Suzuki did. 
50 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 521; SDS, vol. 15, p. 224.
51 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 441; SDS, vol. 15, p. 124.
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According to Ogawa Takashi, who has offered a new view of Chan his-
tory, there were two major currents in Tang dynasty Chan: Mazu Chan and 
Shitou 石頭 (Jp. Sekitō; 710–90) Chan.52 The former is characterized by 
ideas such as “this mind is Buddha” (Ch. shixin shifo 是心是仏; Jp. zeshin 
zebutsu), “functioning is [buddha] nature” (Ch. zuoyong jixing 作用即性; 
Jp. sayū sokushō), and “ordinary doing nothing” (Ch. pingchang wushi 
平常無事; Jp. byōjō buji). In other words, it asserts that everydayness is, as 
it is, the Buddha’s enlightenment. “Functioning is [buddha] nature” means 
that the functions of the senses and consciousness are, as they are, a mani-
festation of buddha-nature. This exact four-character compound, however, 
was not used by Mazu himself. We can see it as a view that embraces one 
as one is. Linji and others express it as “doing nothing.” If understood in an 
extreme fashion, it can be taken to mean that since one is a buddha as one is 
in everyday life, there is no need to engage in religious training.
Shitou, on the other hand, criticized this Mazu Chan. He thought that 
everyday functioning is not the true self, and that, to use Ogawa’s phras-
ing, one must find in the depths of the “self of energeia”/“self of actual-
ity” (genjitsutai no jiko 現実態の自己) the “self of Eigentlichkeit”/“self of 
authenticity” (honraisei no jiko 本来性の自己). Ogawa sees the character-
istics of this Shitou Chan as best expressed in the phrase of his disciple 
Yueshan 藥山 (Jp. Yakusan; 745–828): “He is not similar to me, and I am 
not similar to him.”53 Here, “he/him” is expressed by the third person 
pronoun qu 渠 (Jp. kare). As Ogawa notes, it is “used to abstractly express 
the original person or master of the self, described here as the ‘self of 
authenticity.’”54 Therefore, Yueshan’s words mean that, not being satisfied 
with the self that appears in everyday life, one must arrive at the original self 
that lies in its depths. This directly confronted the issue of religious train-
ing that was lacking in Mazu Chan. However, a new problem appeared: this 
can invite the misunderstanding that this qu is something that actually exists 
separately from “me.” In this way both Mazu and Shitou Chan become prob-
lematic.
Similarly, Suzuki states, “It appears that a large proportion of those under 
Qingyuan like Shitou, Yueshan, Daowu, Yunyan, and Dongshan discussed 
things that would lead to the notion of ‘Person’.”55 In the section “A Person” 
52 Ogawa 2011, ch. 1.
53 Ogawa 2011, p. 112; Sun 2007, p. 224. 
54 Ogawa 2011, p. 113.
55 SDZ, vol. 3, p. 459; SDS, vol. 15, p. 145.
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(hitori 一人) in Zen no shisō, he refers to a discussion between Yunyan and 
Daowu—both in the Shitou lineage—that shows this in an easy-to-understand 
fashion. Yunyan was boiling tea, and his fellow monk Daowu came, and 
asked,
“Who are you boiling that for?” 
Yunyan answered, “There is a person who said he wants it.”
“Shouldn’t you get him to do it himself?”
Yunyan answered, “Well, I am here and so . . .”56 
Here, it appears that there is “a person” separate from “I” (Yunyan). How-
ever, this would be strange. There is no possibility that a supra-individual 
person and an individual “I” would be different.
Linji belonged to Mazu’s lineage. In fact, Linji frequently spoke of “doing 
nothing” and “ordinariness.” For example, he said, “As to the Buddha-
dharma, no effort is necessary. You have only to be ordinary, with nothing 
to do—defecating, urinating, wearing clothes, eating food, and lying down 
when tired,” asserting that there is no Buddhadharma outside of everyday 
life.57 However, if one focuses on the “true person of no rank,” then one 
might think that there is an original self like the one asserted in Shitou 
Chan. Therefore, Ogawa and Kinugawa both are critical of focusing on the 
“true person of no rank” phrase, and see the dharma talk in which it appears 
as having been a failure based on the fact that Linji gives up and returns to 
his quarters (Ch. fangzhang 方丈; Jp. hōjō).58
While I will not embark here on a discussion of the status of the phrase 
“true person of no rank,” there is room to consider whether Linji’s posi-
tion in the Linjilu is really an exact replica of the Mazu Chan “function-
ing is buddha-nature” doctrine. It is certainly true that Linji frequently 
quotes Mazu and attaches importance to this lineage. When read literally, 
the aforementioned phrase “you, who are the persons listening to my dis-
course before my very eyes right now” that Suzuki emphasizes does refer 
to the functioning of perception/consciousness (listening). Therefore, one 
can understand it as referring to the Mazu Chan “functioning as buddha 
nature” doctrine.
However, Linji is not advocating doing nothing. As Suzuki points out, 
Linji changes Mazu’s “functioning” into “Person” and draws considerable 
56 SDZ, vol. 13, p. 160; SDS, vol. 2, p. 193; Jingde chuandeng lu (Jp. Keitoku dentōroku; 
Record of the Transmission of the Lamp Published in the Jingde Era), T no. 2076, 51: 315a.
57 Translation based on Sasaki 2009, p. 185. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 50.
58 Ogawa 2008, p. 181; Kinugawa 2016, p. 100.
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attention to the active nature of the “Person.” Linji states that the “Person” 
who is “right now before my very eyes” engages in the activity of traversing 
“the ten directions” and “freely” being “himself in all three realms.” The 
“Person” also has the ability to preach to the buddhas: “On meeting a bud-
dha, he teaches the buddha.”59 Linji also expresses this functioning as 
“bright and vigorous” (Ch. huo bobode 活撥撥地; Jp. kappatsupacchi).60 
In other words, he is seeking not a zero-degree “doing nothing,” but a three 
hundred sixty degree “doing nothing,” which leads him to issue his famous 
harsh reprimand in the form of a shout (Ch. he 喝; Jp. katsu). With Mazu 
Chan giving rise to a tendency for satisfaction with a zero-degree state, 
Linji wanted practitioners to arrive at the three hundred sixty degree state of 
“doing nothing” through intense religious training.
With the above in mind, it appears that Suzuki’s reading of the Linjilu 
that places at its core the notion of “Person” is not necessarily wrong. Chan, 
while trying to part ways from the study of doctrine, had only been able to 
articulate “thought” in doctrinal studies terms. Suzuki saw Linji, in contrast, 
as having established Chan thought in his idea of “Person” who is entirely 
enmeshed in the concrete. This understanding of Suzuki’s certainly merits 
our consideration.
We should also note that Suzuki, in investigating the relationship in 
Chan/Zen between the supra-individual and the individual, changed his 
view from that in writings such as Nihonteki reisei. In Nihonteki reisei, 
Suzuki considered the supra-individual as a dharma body-like entity that 
dissolved the individual, and held that the “Person” was established when 
the individual arose after this dissolution. However, in Rinzai no kihon 
shisō, he rejects the idea that the individual is dissolved by anything like 
a dharma body. He holds that the “Person” is established when the dis-
crimination of the intellect changes to a spiritual realization, and that the 
supra-individual is the authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) that makes this “Per-
son” be a “Person.” The “Person” comes into existence out of sokuhi-like 
contradictions: the “supra-individual individual” and the “discrimination 
of non-discrimination.” This is another one of Suzuki’s views worth con-
sidering.
However, as I mentioned when discussing Nihonteki reisei, in Suzuki’s 
understanding of “Person,” there is no constitutive moment of the Other. In 
Nihonteki reisei, Suzuki did not fully develop his ideas regarding examples 
59 Translation from Sasaki 2009, p. 192. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 54.
60 Translation from Sasaki 2009, p. 198. Japanese translation in Iriya 1991, p. 61.
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of passivity; it disappears. In Rinzai no kihon shisō, while he covers the 
issue of “belief ” as found in the Linjilu, he does so primarily as belief in 
oneself, and Suzuki does not discuss the Other. One could look for the 
constitutive moment of the Other in Chan/Zen by turning to the teacher-
disciple relationship in the “mind-to-mind transmission” of the teachings 
(Ch. yixin chuanxin 以心伝心; Jp. ishin denshin). Only when a teacher and 
disciple come into contact with one another does “mind-to-mind trans-
mission” arise. Likewise, many Chan/Zen question-and-answer format 
exchanges also vividly show that Chan/Zen does not come into existence 
outside of the coexistence with others. However, both Suzuki and other 
modern interpreters of Chan/Zen in general close off the self from the out-
side world by limiting it to the “investigation of the self” (Jp. koji kyūmei 
己事究明), thus losing sight of an important issue.
(Translated by Dylan Luers Toda)
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